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NOTES
mental injury, which would include defamation and a properly limited
privacy.4 0 This suggestion is hardly practical. Defamation and
privacy are closely related and supplementary, but they would hardly
make good bedfellows. Any attempt to combine the two immediately
meets the difficulties that truth is a defence in defamation and that
equity will not enjoin a libel. If these distinctions are kept then there
is no advantage to be gained from the fusion; if they are not kept
then the fusion results in an upheaval in the law of defamation
which will be much more shocking to the legalistic mind than the
mere recognition of privacy. And to give a "wrongful publicity"
action merely as a limited right of privacy, exclusive of the question
of defamation, would serve only to make a somewhat arbitrary division of a general right, would meet with the same difficulties now
confronting the growth of the law of privacy, and would probably
result in the exclusion of more than one legitimate case unfortunate
enough to differ in degree though not in kind. The best solution
seems to be to continue along the trail now blazed by authority.
HENRY BRANDIs, JR.
ADMISSIBILITY OF PHOTOGRAPHS AS EVIDENCE

Long ago, the poet Horace spoke of the greater effect of that
which is seen than of that which is described by words.' There
are three ways of appealing to the eyes of the jury: (1) by production of the "primary real evidence", 2 a thing or object for the per"Note (1910) 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991. The argument is that the phrase,
"wrongful publicity" presupposes that there are forms of publicity which are
not actiqnable, and thus the field is limited.
"'Aut agitur res in scenis, aut acta refertur,
Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem,
Quam quae sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus, et quae
Ipse sibi sibi tradit spectator' (Horatius ad Pisones)."
See Warlick v. White, 76 N. C. 175, 179. For effective use of photographs
in disputed document cases, see OsBoaR, THE PROBLEm OF PROOF (1922). In general, see 2 WIGMoaR, EVmENCE, ch. 37, p. 1344, "Autoptic Proference."

"The classification by Bentham of all evidence into real evidence, as the evidence of things, and personal evidence as that of persons, has inaugurated a
long train of errors in the theory of proof: see GULSON, PHILOSOPHY OF
PROOF. (2d Ed. 1923). Mr. Gulson says real evidence differs from personal only in the mode in which a fact is laid before the tribunal. "It is evidence obtained by the court through the mere exercise of its own perceptive
faculties, while 'personal' as defined by Mr. Best, is the evidence acquired
through the perceptions of other persons or witnesses, who report or communicate their experience to, the tribunal."
"Primary evidence" of a thing is the term applied by our jurists to the real
evidence of its own nature afforded by the production in court of the thing
or document itself; any other mode of proving the terms of the document
or the nature of the thing being designated by the phrase "secondary evidence":
GutsoN, PHILOSOPHY OF PROOF.

(2 Ed. 1923), p. 258.
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sonal examination of the tribunal; (2) by photographs, 8 radiographs,
skiagraphs, etc.; (3) by maps, 4 diagrams, models,5 miniatures. Each
requires identification as evidence. 0 Without it, they are valueless, as
"testimonial non-entities," 7 no more admissible than an anonymous
letter. As to the accuracy and reliability of transmission from actuality, apart from the oath of the witness identifying them, they vary
greatly. The first class is conclusive as to the nature of the object
produced; the second is somewhat less accurate, depending upon the
nature of the thing reproduced, and the certainty of the process and
the skill of the photographer; the items of the third class have no
reliability except insofar as the witness explains them and vouches
for their correctness.
A foundation for the admission of the ordinary photograph may
be laid down in two ways.8 A witness who is familiar with the per'Photographs' are within the class of real, or immediate, evidence, where
a re-production of the thing comes under the cognizance of the senses. WIGoRE, EvIDENcE, §790; 4 JONES, EvmnzxcE (2d. Ed. 1926) §1749, p. 3210.
"While embodying some elements of "autoptic proference," in that they
express a meaning through sense of sight, maps and diagrams are transmitted
evidence, -rather than immediate evidence.
Evidence has been divided into "(1) immediate, where the inquirer or
recipient of the evidence ascertains the proximate fact, i.e., the fact whether
principal or evidentiary, which is the actual subject of proof, by means of his
own individual perceptions; and (2) Transmitted where he ascertains the same
fact through the medium of the perceptive faculties of some other person,
whose knowledge of the fact is manifested to him by some voluntary act;
that is to say, either by the utterance of language written or spoken, or
by voluntary signs or gestures, or even by general conduct, and behaviour; all
which spontaneous manifestations or indications of knowledge may be summed
up under the title of 'communications'". GULSON, PHILOSOPHY OF PROOF,
p. 122.
Artistic reproductions of situation, or tableaux vivants, however, have been
excluded by courts admitting photographs of actual scenes of inanimate objects: Rodick v. Me. Cent. R. Co. 109 Me. 530, 85 Atl. 41 (1912); Colonial
Refining Co. v. Lathrop, 64 Okla. 47, 166 Pac. 747, L. R. A. 1917 F 890 (1917);
Fore v. State, 75 Miss. 727, 23 So. 710 (1898).
'WIGMORO,Evidence §§790, 793. The authenticity of the first type depends.
upon oral testimony identifying the thing with the inquiry; authenticity of
photographs depends upon both identification of subject matter and verification
of the reproduction.
SWic.mon, Evidence §792.
'Baustian v. Young, 152 Mo. 317, 53 S. W. 921, 75 Am. St. Rep. 462, and

note (1899); Louisville v. Brown, 127 Ky. 732, 106 S. W. 795, 13 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 1135 (1908) ; McKarren v. Boston, 194 Mass. 179, 80 N. E. 477, 10'
Ann. Cas. 961 (1907) ; Carlson v. Benton, 66 Neb. 486, 92 N. W. 600 (1902) ;
Alberti v. Railroad, 118 N. Y. 77, 23 N. E. 35, 6 L. R. A. 765 (1889);
Dederichs v. Salt Lake, 14 Utah 137, 46 Pac. 656, 35 L. R. A. 802 and note
(1896) ; Selleck v. Janesville, 104 Wis. 570, 47 L. R. A. 691, 80 N. W. 944

(1899).

The extent of the discretion of the trial court in admitting or excluding
photographs as evidence does not differ from that which it exercises with
respect to other kinds of evidence: note 35 L. R. A. 805. Most cases exclud-
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son, place, thing or condition which the picture purports to represent

may testify that it correctly portrays this thing. Or the accuracy of
the picture may be established by testimony of the photographer,
that it is the result of a process mechanically reliable. The term
accuracy as here used means only reasonable accuracy for the purpose of informing the jury. 9 As stated -by Professor Wigmore, a
photograph is somebody's non-verbal testimony ;1o hence on the one

hand it can be received only when verified by a witness competent
to speak to the facts represented, and on the other hand, the maker

is immaterial, provided'a competent witness verifies it. Where its
general correctness is verified, the photograph is direct evidence
of things therein which have not been specifically described by the
witness as having come within his observation."
The basic precautionary rules which apply to all evidence apply

here as well. The subject matter of the picture must be relevant to the issues, and must not be misleading in nature, or such
as to stir the passion or prejudice of the jury.12 If inspection of the
thing itself, produced before the tribunal, is proper, then the photograph is competent.' 3 The possibility of the photograph misrepresenting by intentional distortion is of itself no objection to the
admissibility, "any more than is the possibility of an oral witness so
twisting his tongue as to lie about what he saw."'14 Against possible
misrepresentation, intentional or unintentional, an adequate protecing photographs do so because of improper verification or change in surround-

ings when taken: 55 A. L. R. 1345 note.
'Leland v. Leonard, 74 Vt. 496, 112 Atl. 198 (1921).
" 2 WIGMORE, Evidence §§790, 793 (1904). Clark, C. J., dissenting in Hampton v. R. R. Co., 120 N. C. 534, 27 S. E. 963 (1897) says: "A map not made
under the order of the court is really only the declaration, so to speak, of the
party making it. Its reliability depends entirely upon his accuracy, and conscientiousness, and is therefore only admissible as his evidence, and because it
may convey to the eyes of the jury somewhat more accurately the description
which the witness was endeavoring to convey to their ears by his oral testimony:'
' 10 R. C. L. 357, p. 1155, note 4; Baustian v. Young, supra note 7, where
it issaid: "It is not admissible in evidence at all until it is proven by testimony aliunde to be a true photographic print of the thing in question, but
after that foundation has been laid, the photograph speaks with a certain
probative force in itself."
"2 Wim omR.Evidence §§1154-59 (1904). In Brown v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 65 Mich. 306, 32 N. W. 610, 8 Am. St. Rep. 894 (1887), the court rejected a
photograph offered to show g6od health, taking judicial notice that a photographer's business was to make the sitter appear at his best. If the true
situation or nature of the object is not apprehensible from observation of the
photograph, oral testimony may be required in explanation.
" The granting or refusal of a view by the jury has been within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Jenkins v. R. R., 110 N. C. 438, 15 S.E. 193
(1892) ; State v. Perry, 121 N. C. 533, 27 S.E. 997 (1897).
"42 WIGMORE, Evidence §792 (1904).
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tion is a careful cross-examination regarding the process by which
14
the picture was made.
As against this background, the North Carolina court says that
a photograph is not admissible as "substantive evidence," or even
"as evidence," but "merely for the purpose of allowing the witness
to illustrate his testimony."' 5
In Honeycutt v. Cherokee Brick Co., 15 photographs of the machine, upon which it was alleged the deceased was killed, and the
surroundings and attachments thereof, were offered in evidence.
There was evidence tending to show that these photographs correctly represented the machine and the surroundings, and they were
received in evidence generally, over the objection (which was general) of the defendant. Held: The admission of the photographs "as
substantive evidence" constituted error. New trial.
Then what is evidence ?16 All three of the above means of appealing to the jury constitute evidence. The map or diagram is
expressive only when coupled with the explanation of the witness;
it is of evidentiary value as to the character of its subject only as a part
of the witness's testimony, similar to a memorandum admitted as
"past recollection recorded." 17 When used, it comes before the jury
"as evidence," nevertheless. A photograph purporting to represent
the actual situation or object existing at the time of the event or
injury complained of, is self-explanatory. While adopted as the
testimony of the witness, it goes far beyond any possible oral description.
Then is a photograph "substantive evidence"? The first use of
this term was to distinguish evidence offered upon an issue in the
case from impeaching evidence.1 3 If the photograph is relevant
at all here, it is material upon the issue in the case.19 *Asan attempt
"Honeycutt v. Cherokee Brick Co., 196 N. C. 556, 146 S. E. 227 (1929);
Kepley v. Kirk, 191 N. C. 690, 132 S. E. 788 (1926), involving use of a map.
" "Evidence is any matter of fact which is furnished to a legal tribunal
otherwise than by reasoning or a reference to what is noticed without proofas the basis of inference in ascertaining some other matter of fact," Thayer,
Presumptions and the Law of Evidence 3 Harv. Law Rev. 142 (1889). See
1 WIGMoaE, EVIDENCE: §1: "Any knowable fact or group of facts not a legal
or a logical principle, considered with a view to its being offered before a
legal tribunal for the purpose of producing a conviction, positive or negative,
on the part of the tribunal, as to the truth of a proposition, not of law or of
logic, on which the determination of the tribunal is to be asked."
"WGmoPE, EvmiDEc §791, note 2.
Medlin v. Co. Board of Education, 167 N. C. 239, 83 S. E. 483 (1914).
19
A possible misconception of the photograph as evidence is indicated by
the headnote in the official report of I-Ioneycutt v. Brick Co., supra note 14,
where it is stated that the error of lower court was "admission of such photo-
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to relegate photographs from the superior realm of immediate evidence, to the inferior plane of transmitted evidence, the limitation
is of no substantial effect. 20 Possibly, it is a distinction between
the formal introduction of a photograph as part of the record, 21
as a document, and the informal production to the jury by the
witness, the latter being the usual practice. It is to be observed that
the admission of photographs under the view prevailing in other
jurisdictions, without the distinction bet-ween "substantive' and
"illustrative" evidence, would not be admitting them as "orginal"
or "independent" evidence. Although appealing to the senses, their
character as secondary evidence requiring verification can not be lost
sight of. 22 If the expression of our court is used in the sense that
the photograph requires authentication by a witness as a correct representation, then its use is intelligible; but there is no reason to
require that the jury be told about this, because when.admitted it is
apparent of all men that it has been authenticated.
Probably in the minds of the court is the idea that the jury should
be told of the possibility of error in fransmission, in reproduction of
the situation or object, since the man in the street might assume the
photograph was necessarily accurate.23
This objection, however,
graph as substantive evidence of the master's failure to supply his servant

with safe tools." The photograph is proper evidence of the nature of the
machine, and if the defect is apparent from a view of the machine, the picture
is proper to show this fact. Cf. Baustian v. Young, supra note 7.
So
Supra note 4; GuLsox, PHIaosoPay OF PRoor, p. 140: "The true test of
the distinction between immediate and transrmitted evidence-between facts that
are either actually perceived or legitimately inferred from others that are
perceived, and facts that are only communicated-is the question, whether,
in each case, the fact which is the subject of our inquiry be, or be not, as it
were, vitiated by passing in its course to us through the mind (i.e., from the

knowledge to the will) or some other rational agent."
In -Angelo v. Winston-Salem, 193 N. C. 207, 209, photographs of the
market under consideration were "filed as exhibits," reproduced in the report
and said to "fully corroborate the statements" of the court as to equipment
of market. No jury was had here, however. Also in Parker v. R. R., 181
N. C. 95, 100, 106 S. E. 755 (1921), the railroad crossing scene was reproduced
and apparently used before the jury without objection.
'But such misconception of the nature of the photograph as evidence is
indicated in Hanipton v. R. R., supra note 9, where it is said: ". . . it seems
to have been altogether proper to exclude the photograph whether introduced
as original,independent evidence or as an unauthorized map." See supra note 2;
WxGsoax, EvrDENcE §790. Photographs are never primary or original evidence except where the issues turn about -the photograph as an object in itself,
such as in a prosecution for sale of obscene pictures, as in People v. Muller,
96 N. Y. 408, 48 Am. Rep. 635 (1884).

1 Of course, they are never conclusive or unimpeachable: Higgs v. Minn.

St. P. and S. St. M. Ry. Co., 16 N. D. 446, 15 L. P_ A. (N. S.) 1162, 114
N. W. 722, 15 Anno. Cas. 97 note (1908), rest upon human testimony and unverified carry no conviction as to correctness; Baustian v. Young, supra note 7.
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goes to the weight of the photograph as evidence, rather than to its
admissibility. If that :be the meaning, the rule ought to require
explicit caution by the court to the jury, upon request to that effect,
as in the case of testimony of interested parties. The omission to
give such caution, unless specifically requested, ought not be grounds
for reversal.
The origin of the expression "not admissible as substantive evidence but merely aA illustrative of the testimony," in our cases, is
vague. The first case involving the admissibility of photographs, excluded them from evidence because taken two years after the time
of the event under inquiry.2 4 In the next case, photographs of the
deceased child before and after injury, but before death, were admitted generally without any instructions that they were not substantive evidence. 25 Also, photographs of cattle at the depot of the
defendant were held "admissible in evidence when shown to be a
true representation and to have been taken under proper safeguards." 26 It does not appear that these views were repudiated by
the court before the case of Honeycutt vs. Brick Company.27 The
expression later appears in cases where the admission of photographs
as "illustrative" evidence was approved, there being intimations by
the court that they would not have been admissible for any other
"purpose". 28 It is probable that the expression was originally used
The fear of the courts in this direction is indicated by Prof. Wigmore:
"Does it purport to be a picture of the place of a murder? We look at it with
an interest based on the unconscious assumption that it is that house. In short,
we unwittingly give the document the credit of speaking for itself; though no
human being has yet spoken for it. Now this tendency has to be sternly repressed; and ... so it is here that the tendency has so frequently to be struck
at by judicial rulings." WIGfo0Rr, EviDEimcE §790.
"'Hampton v. R. R., supra note 9, Clark, C. J.dissenting.
'Davis v.R. R., 136 N. C. 115, 48 S. E. 591 (1904).
'Bane v.R. M, 171 N. C. 328, 88 S. E. 477 (1916).

' Supra note 15.

' In Pickett v. R. M., 153 N.C. 148, 69 S. E. 81 (1910), where inquiry was
as to effect of diversion of water upon land, witness was allowed to use photo
taken after change of course of the water, to describe the condition of the land
previous to the taking of the picture.
Hoyle v.Hickory, 167 N. C. 619, 83 S. E. 758 (1914) : "If the lot continued
to be washed by surface water, it was competent to be shown by witnesses, with
aid of picture, reproduced exactly like the true situation. It might be impossible to illustrate it, or to give the jury a correct idea of the damage, if any,
in any other way."
In State v. Jones, 175 N. C. 709, 95 S. E. 576 (1918), the photograph purported to represent how metal parts found on defendant's premises might be
assembled to form a whiskey still, the arrangement requiring explanation to become fully intelligible to jury. Here Clark, C. J., in opinion of the court says:
"A trial is a search for truth, and no court will exclude testimony that will
be an aid to that end, whether it is oral testimony, a photograph ... subject
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in reference to diagrams which were unintelligible to the jury, or
meaningless, without explanation of the witness; and the court
applied the expression to the use of photographs generally without
adverting to the fact that some photographs are intelligible without
explanation. The photographs introduced in the cases where is found
this limitation, either were not representations of the actual situations or were not intelligible apart from testimony of the witness.
Notwithstanding intimations in these cases, the court admitted X-ray
photographs as evidence for the consideration of the jury in a recent
decision, "upon the same basis as .photographs."29
It is submitted that the photographs in the Honeycutt case were
properly authenticated, and warranted consideration by the jury as
to the nature of the machine upon which it was alleged deceased was
killed. The instructions to the jury that they were not "substantive
evidence," the omission of which caused a reversal, it is believed,
would have been entirely without useful influence upon the jury's
consideration of them.
JoaN H. ANDERSON, JR.
ADVISORY OPINIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA

The Senate of North Carolina forwarded a resolution to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, requesting advice on the constitutionality of two bills proposing changes in the system of Superior
Courts. A letter in reply, signed by the Chief Justice, expressed
the view that the members of the Court would -be willing to follow
the precedent of their predecessors in giving opinions to the legislato ... (best evidence rule) ... and cross-examination and opposing evidence."
State v. Kee, 186 N. C. 473, 119 S. E. 893 (1923), involved map drawn on
floor, which it was said was not "evidence."
State v. Lutterloh, 188 N. C. 412, 124 S. E. 752 (1924), photograph of reconstructed scene admissible as "illustrative evidence," explanation of the reconstructed scene being necessary by witness.
State v. Mitchen, 188 N. C. 608, 125 S. E. 190 (1924), admission as "illustrative evidence" approved.
In Elliott v. Power Co., Varsar, J., said: "It was not error for the court
to allow the jury to consider the pictures for this purpose (explaining witness's
testimony) and to give thein smch weight if any, as the jury may find they are
entitled in explaining the testimony." (Italics ours).
State v. Mathews, 191 N. C. 378, 131 S. E. 743 (1926), is probably the
strongest suport for Honeycutt v. Brick Co., supra note 14. In that case, however, the photographs were of tableaux vivants, the reconstructed scene of the
crime, the admission of which would have been held error by courts which admit
photographs of the actual, unreconstructed scenes, supra note 5.
Lupton v.Express Co., 169 N. C. 675, 86 S. E. 583 (1915). See 2 WIGUORE,
EVIDENCE §795; Wilson, The X-Ray in Court, 7 CORNELL L. QT. 203.

